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A NEW-OLD APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF CANADA'S PARLIAMENT

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It is a pleasure to participate in this Conference on Confederation and to talk about the House of Commons, especially during the year of its 150th anniversary. I am sure that I speak for everyone in the room when I say that I, as do they, treat the House of Commons seriously. Still, I want to explain what I mean when I use that adverb. I will not go into great detail, except to say that I began teaching in the Department of Economics and Political Science at the University of Saskatchewan in 1964. The senior political scientist at that time was Norman Ward, a scholar of renown in matters of Canadian politics and government and also a nationally recognized humorist, who had won the Leacock Medal for works like *Mice in the Beer*. People who knew him invariably spoke of his humour and seldom of his knowledge of the intricacies of representation. His reputation as a very pleasant man rested in part on his discretion—he never talked about colleagues or individuals generally. Therefore, I was taken aback one day when during the 1980 federal election campaign, he appeared in my office extremely agitated and, pointing to an election poster showing the back of the head of the local Rhino candidate, said with emotion in his voice: “Thousands of Canadians gave their lives so that we might live in a free country. Elections are not a joke,” I fear it says something about how shallow and callow I was (at age 44) that this moment had such a lasting impression on me. By this time in my career I had written a couple of books, and I thought of myself as a serious scholar. And I was, I did not fabricate footnotes or invent alternative facts. But at that moment, I believe, I appreciated for the first time that the study of Canadian politics was more than an academic exercise. Both its study and practice mattered enormously because the consequences of not adopting that view could have serious repercussions. As it happened the outcome of the 1980 federal election did produce an unexpected result: the Liberal party led by Pierre Trudeau won a majority but elected no candidates west of Manitoba. For the first time, a Canadian prime minister selected three senators, one each from Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia, to sit in cabinet as their province’s respective ‘minister.’

Whatever one may think of that decision or of the Senate in general, the act of appointing senators in this situation underlined a fundamental fact of Canadian elections that frequently, despite its centrality to the constitution, is often ignored: the key to elections in Canada is that they are a prerequisite to government formation. Governments are not elected, rather ministers are appointed by the governor general on recommendation of the prime minister. The argument against the aborted Liberal-NDP coalition in 2008—that the opposition might, in Michael Bliss’s words, “legally succeed in what millions of

Canadians see as the overturning of the outcome of the democratic election, and do so without giving Canadians the ultimate say in the matter”—neatly epitomized the conundrum: the law and the constitution may be the preserve of the governor general but selection of a government (and by default an opposition) rests with the people.¹ Why, one wonders, do people not understand how the constitution works, and has worked? Is lack of interest in constitutional matters the result, as Vernon Bogdanor has said in Great Britain, of “not hav[ing] a codified constitution in the first and narrower sense of the term” and as a result no criterion for deciding what is constitutional and what is not?² In its opinion on the constitutionality of the Harper government’s proposal to introduce consultative elections and term appointments for the Senate, the Supreme Court of Canada used the metaphor of the constitution’s architecture to analyze the implications of the proposed legislation. It is not my intent to evaluate the utility of that metaphor to the terms of constitutional debate so much as to note that its scope is far broader than the institutional focus the 2014 advisory opinion might be taken to mean. For instance, are officers of Parliament a structural element of that larger design?

Many reasons might be cited for the importance of Parliament. One I would note is that Canadians are not born but made. In that respect and, unlike Italy, Canada is not, as Cavour described his country, a geographic expression. Yet as a devotee of the political economy scholarship of Harold Innis and Donald Creighton, a long-time resident of Saskatchewan, and a native Nova Scotian, I make that claim with some reservation. You cannot teach in a classroom in Saskatoon that looks out on the South Saskatchewan River and not think of the reach of the empire of the St. Lawrence. Rivers are roads that move and whether it was the voyageurs and the fur trade or the wheat pools and the grain trade, the wealth of the West poured through the port of Montreal. Jimmy Gardiner, whose biography Norman Ward and I wrote, and who must still lay claim to a legislative record of uninterrupted public office -- 44 years from 1914 to 1958 (as MLA, provincial cabinet minister, premier, leader of the opposition, federal minister of agriculture from 1935 to 1958, and who sought but lost the Liberal party leadership to Louis St. Laurent) once said in a speech to the Montreal Board of Trade that if it were not for the transport of prairie grain Montreal would still be Hochelaga. Exaggerated perhaps, but the economic unity the comment implied was of a piece with the political unity that Parliament provided and which Gardiner, the ‘relentless Liberal,’ epitomized. For several decades in the mid-twentieth century Saskatchewan was Canada’s third most populous province and had the third largest number of seats in the House of Commons. Between 1906 and 1936, a quinquennial census of the three Prairie Provinces was instituted to take account, literally, of the massive growth in population. The holding of an election in 1921, before the decennial census was completed, meant that the prairies were deprived of the representation to which they were entitled and thus the strength of the new Progressive movement devalued, a bitter grievance about legislative representation that the farmers nursed for some years. Quebec in this period (after the First World War) was a Liberal bastion and Ontario was divided between Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties. Thus, Saskatchewan Liberal ‘machine’ determined the electoral outcome. This was the era of strong ministers, strong governments, and strong parties. The architecture then was built by and reflected the priorities of such actors.

The study of Canadian politics and especially the House of Commons reflected this orientation as well. The cynosure of that enterprise was R. MacGregor Dawson. It was he who groomed a generation of male graduate students (Evelyn Eager was a rare exception to that generalization) to explore, often for the first time, the institutions of Canadian government. Part of the explanation for the talent he attracted is that because of the Second World War and wartime currency restrictions, it was not

possible for students to leave Canada. Dawson had done his own graduate work at the London School of Economics and his PhD dissertation, supervised by Graham Wallas, was eventually published under the title of *The Principle of Official Independence: with particular reference to the political history of Canada*.³ This was only the beginning of his mammoth exploration of Canadian political institutions. Another seminal, edited work was *Constitutional Issues in Canada, 1900-1931*.⁴ One of its nine chapters was devoted to the House of Commons, with sections on representation, perversions of representation, procedure, and political parties in the house, while the other chapters examined the Constitution, the Governor General, the Cabinet, the Senate, the Civil Service, the Judiciary, Political Parties, and Dominion-Provincial Relations. More than eight decades later, and after the tumult of the Pearson, Trudeau and Mulroney years, the absence of federalism as a topic for inclusion is striking. In the words of W.P.M. Kennedy, a legal scholar whose work appeared in the book, the explanation for the silence lay in the fact that “the federal idea [in Canada] was never driven to its full logical conclusions. The Senate represents no clear-cut federal principle as in the United States; and consequently the federal idea had sought from, and has been granted by, political parties a place in the other organs of government.”⁵ Contrary to the theory popular next door in the United States, federalism in Canada, in its political as contrasted to its jurisdictional guise, was likely to be reflected as much in the lower as in the upper house of Parliament. As a general statement, it could be said that Dawson’s perspective of Canadian politics was from on high. Ward once remarked: “I don’t think it ever occurred to Dawson that a student of the House of Commons ... should actually watch it a great deal. You worked from the record, which you could then cite.”⁶

In this regard, Ward for a long time followed his mentor, as his many studies of Parliament illustrate: *The Canadian House of Commons: Representation*;⁷ *The Public Purse: A Study in Canadian Democracy*;⁸ revision of the fifth edition of Dawson, *The Government of Canada*.⁹ For a sense of the Ward--Dawson approaches, one should examine the essays of contributors in their respective festschrifts: John C. Courtney, ed., *The Canadian House of Commons: Essays in Honour of Norman Ward*¹⁰ and J.H. Aitchison, *The Political Process in Canada: Essays in Honour of R. MacGregor Dawson*.¹¹ In the mid-1960s this ‘distanced’ analysis of politics began to change. The Report of the Committee on Election Expenses, a committee of which Ward was a member, and whose recommendations led to Canada’s regime of election expenses appeared (Ottawa, 1966) and the federal electoral boundaries commissions, the Saskatchewan commission of which Ward was a frequent member, shifted scholarly attention from institutions to electors and the elected.

Significantly, the demands of federalism, as interpreted in 1960s Canada, and equally significantly the work of royal commissions accentuated this trend away from institutions, as seen in Norman Ward and David Hoffman, *Bilingualism and Biculturalism in the Canadian House of Commons*.¹² The study for the B and B commission reflected a more personal, individualistic approach to analyzing legislatures--turning from the emphasis on great men, so recently seen in Ward’s *A Party Politician: Memoirs of Chubby Power*.¹³ Here was a focus that reflected the growing attention being paid to Canadian society (or societies) at both top and bottom: How did MPs as a collective reflect their society? How did individual MPs respond to the conflicting demands of party and constituency? Was discipline as strong on MPs in all parts of the country? Was it the same regardless of language spoken? With whom did MPs associate when they were in Ottawa? As a result of this change in perspective, MPs ceased to be treated as officials of the body to which they were elected and increasingly came to be viewed as representatives of the constituency from which they were chosen. You will have to read the studies yourself to discover

the answers to those specific questions, but in the 1960s the questions were finally being asked, as scholars looked to the grass-roots of politics. A primary influence here (with a time lag, to be sure) was the monumental research of Lewis Namier in *The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George 111*.¹⁴ The thesis of that magisterial work is that one could actually learn something about politics from studying the behaviour, friendship, and connections of MPs, as well as the politics of the ordinary man and woman. Later, the same disposition became evident in other areas of scholarship, such as the federalism of small things, be they cooperatives, religious bodies, or business organizations.

Obviously, an important shift was underway, one to which the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms played an essential part, but even more so one that involved Parliament itself. Initially, this took place through the work of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada in 1980. That Committee held 106 meetings over 56 hearing days, heard 104 representations, and received over one thousand written submissions.¹⁵ The emergence of a sense of rules and rights has contributed to an altered focus on what might be called the miniaturization of politics—no longer is it the institution but rather its components that attract attention. It is this alteration in perspective that contributes to the growing emphasis on arguments for change of the electoral system, for reduction in party discipline, and for curtailment in the power of the office of prime minister, all in the service of checking what critics describe as Canada's 'failing democracy,' although too often the admonition is made without a clear sense of the object sought or its implications for the operation of the House of Commons, and Parliament more generally.¹⁶

Doubtless, one can and should have a debate about these objects. Yet whatever the conclusion reached, I would continue to stress as a primary focus for study and research the contribution the House of Commons makes to protecting Canadian federalism and to Canada's distinctive history and practice of representation. The premise that informed much of the recent debate and discussion over reform to the electoral system concerned the transposition of votes into seats. Yet this object has always been of second-order importance in Canada, that is, second to control, beginning with the struggle for and achievement of responsible government in the colonies of British North America. More than that, and rather surprisingly, Canada's parliamentary representation has historically been used to counter the dominance of areas of population growth. Allow me to offer two pieces of evidence.

First, the extension of the franchise and the expansion of the federation led to the Constitution Act, 1915, which amended the 1867 Act by the addition of section 51A, which reads: "Notwithstanding anything in this Act, a province shall always be entitled to a number of members in the House of Commons not less than the number of senators representing such province." The 1915 Act arose in response to a "Memorandum on Representation" whose object was to restore the "representation of the Maritime Provinces in the House of Commons ... to the number allowed upon entering confederation upon terms that the same may not in future be subject to reduction in that number."¹⁷ The nexus thus created between a province's Commons and Senate seat allocations has fixed the attention of small provinces in particular upon the guarantee the nexus provides and strengthened their resolve to resist any change that might threaten it. The desire of the Maritime Provinces (in 1913) for predictability as to their numbers in Parliament achieved a level of unimagined certainty decades later in the Constitution Act, 1982 (s.44), when one of the four specified matters requiring unanimous consent for their amendment—the Crown, the Supreme Court of Canada, the use of the English or the French language were the others—was the guarantee that no province should have fewer members of the House of Commons than it had senators. In this sense, rep-by-pop as a principle was made subservient

to the right to adequate representation, whether, it should be noted, the principle applied to provinces or people.

Nor is that order of preference a value from the past, as the second example will illustrate. When the Supreme Court of Canada was given an opportunity to offer its opinion—on Saskatchewan’s constituency boundaries, enacted in 1989 and which provided for categories of urban, rural, and northern seats with generous provisions for population disparity, the Court found that the purpose of the right to vote enshrined in Section 3 of the Charter is not equality of voting power per se, but the right to “effective representation.” Lest there be any doubt as to the inference to be drawn from the Court’s opinion, it should be noted that the question had come on appeal from a decision of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, which spoke of “no person’s portion of sovereign power exceed[ing] that of another’ and posited ‘the idea of equality [as] inherent in the right to vote.”¹⁸ To one commentator, the Supreme Court’s response could be interpreted as saying that “it was possible to have too much equality if it was achieved at the expense of other factors pertinent to effective representation.”¹⁹ “Too much equality.” Could any phrase be more un-republican, or more Canadian? In this regard, it is imperative to recall that Canada is a constitutional monarchy and that the prerogative of the Crown, even after the achievement of responsible government, had the effect of distancing Canadian rulers from the people they served. The United States may fall short in realizing the goal of equality, but it does have a goal. And that is because they have a theory of representation, which Canadians do not. In this respect, we are true descendants of George Etienne Cartier: “The count of heads,” he once said, “must not always be permitted to outweigh every other consideration.”²⁰ By contrast, under the American constitution, according to historian Arthur Sheps: “*In all its parts, the representative part [is] the whole of it.*”²¹

The thesis of this paper thus far concerns the transformation in scholarly perspective on studies of the House of Commons: basically, from a concentration on institutions to one on individuals. Yet in 2017 a contrary development is clearly underway: from what might be described as personal to constitutional imagery. At one level, there are the constitutional amendment provisions adopted in 1982 and which rather than empowering individuals have worked instead to re-inforce the Crown (for example, the experience with fixed date elections). But another dimension of constitutional imagery, possessing the potential to alter the conduct of Canadian parliamentary politics, is the appearance of a very different upper chamber from one that either Dawson or Ward might have conceived. The word ‘bicameral’ does not appear in the index of Dawson and Ward’s *The Government of Canada*. That omission will be inexcusable in any forthcoming work on the subject. At the very time when critics paint members of Parliament as impotent in the face of party discipline, when their turnover rate increases at each election, with the result that Canadian MPs have less experience than their counterparts in other Westminster-based parliamentary systems, and when their numbers grow from decade to decade (the size of the Commons over the past century has increased by almost the size of the Senate), the Senate is entering upon a period where party discipline seems destined to be an artifact of the past and where party affiliation may no longer be an assumed criterion for appointment. In a number of respects the characteristics of the ‘new Senate’ appear to be those that critics of the House of Commons say they wish described MPs: freedom and independence from the iron discipline of party.

‘Branding,’ a variation on the more familiar tool of marketing in general, according to political scientist Alex Marland, is as much a feature of electoral politics today as it is of commerce and for many of the same reasons, especially in the field of communications: “Advocates of constituency representation

underappreciate how forcefully communications technology shines the spotlight on party leaders and on any hint of group division.”²² In this context, Marland unexpectedly asserts that “the Senate holds the most promise for the people’s representatives to challenge the PMO’s influence.” More than that, he perceives “the public demand for that outdated institution to hold the political executive and permanent government to account [will] grow with the diffusion of communications technology.”²³ In short, need and opportunity conspire to raise the Senate’s visibility and legitimacy in modern Canada. The question that occasions the present commentary and which preoccupies Senate discussion today is how to operate the chamber in a situation where the promise to remove partisanship from the nomination process for Senate appointment has become a reality.

That this *is* the issue is indisputable, and the reason why it must be tackled is the one to which some senators have alluded: in light of oppressive party discipline in the Commons, the only real debate happens in the Senate. If the dialectic of parliamentary politics ultimately leads to a need to choose, and if party discipline suffocates meaningful choice in the lower chamber, then it rests with the complementary and compensatory upper house to assure that real debate takes place on issues of national importance to the citizens of Canada. The imperative of the executive and the party discipline that makes that possible are detrimental to the House of Commons fulfilling the functions theories of parliamentary government assign it. By contrast, and stated most simply, the Senate of Canada is free of such constraints, as it is free of the gradations-- backbench versus frontbench, for example—that characterized the Commons. Is it possible that the behaviour of senators will embolden MPs?

It is heartening to see recent assessments of the Senate’s activities and membership adopt a more favourable tone than in the past, although it would be misleading to think revisionism is universal. Still it is not academics alone who speak less critically than they once did. Statements from the public supportive of the work of senators were frequently heard during the debate on C-14 (*Medical Assistance in Dying*) in 2016. On that bill and on legislative participation generally, the public—and equally important, the media—have come to see and appreciate the crucial contribution the Senate can make to the passage of good legislation. All the more reason then, as the Senate traces its way along un-blazed organizational trails, to make haste cautiously. The most quoted line from Giuseppe di Lampedusa’s novel, *The Leopard*,²⁴ a story of institutional turmoil in Risorgimento Italy, says: “If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change.” The conundrum articulated in that declaration is similar to the one that now faces senators: how to maintain the constitutional architecture intact (as regards the Senate) while at the same time incorporating structural alterations to accommodate change for which there is no blueprint? What is the relationship to be between the two houses of Parliament? Surely, it cannot be enough to repeat—and repeat—that the Senate is not a confidence chamber and thus any perceptible influence it exercises over the manner or form of legislation be labelled impermissible.

The question, which witnesses before the Senate Modernization Committee have recently addressed but failed to answer conclusively, is how in the new, non-binary world of Independent, Liberal, and Conservative senators, is the chamber to organize its activities? My (to be personal) response is that the more immediate matter to study is not the answer to the query ‘how should the Senate organize its activities,’ but rather to consider closely what it is senators think they should do in their capacity as members of Parliament’s upper chamber, and then develop mechanisms to enable them to accomplish that end. For instance, if as has been suggested, the Senate has a role as an organ of dissent at a time when the executive, and party discipline more generally, suffocate opposition in the Commons, how is

that enterprise to be facilitated? Speech-making is a central activity of Parliament in all its manifestations. But speechmaking is about more than talking. It requires listeners and critics if it is to have effect. That is a vital function of a caucus free of dictation. Caucus offers a forum where debate and analysis of proposed legislation may occur and be improved as a result of scrutiny. The result of caucus deliberations and informed debate, where arguments for and against whatever motion or subject is before the chamber are advanced, is a record of opinion which thereafter may be consulted, indeed cited, as in courts. The central question is how to organize the Senate's business so this function of the chamber—the free expression of informed opinion—is performed expeditiously and beneficially in the service of Canadian citizens.

The Senate stands at an unprecedented moment in its history—and for that matter in the history of second chambers generally. The Senate is in a position where it can affect the course and quality of Canadian politics and democracy for the foreseeable future. Any study of Canadian public opinion today will reveal that Canadians are divided in their view of partisanship and politics. On the one hand, there is, as there has been for almost two centuries, very strong commitment to the exercise of responsible government which, in the parliamentary model that exists in this country, means partisan government. But on the other hand, there is widespread criticism of partisan behaviour that curtails the expression of public opinion. According to an Environics Survey 2016 re “Canadian Public Opinion on Governance”: discretionary power is viewed as corrupt power. Certainly, for those who define a constitution as ‘limits,’ it is hard to see a constitution where there are no limits. Does the Senate offer a limit? Examples of what might be called this ‘divided-self’ were on display frequently in the recent debate over changing the electoral system in the lower house. The resolution of that conundrum, if there is one, may be a different matter from the subject that confronts the upper chamber. Yet the Senate is in a position to assuage criticism of the practice of parliamentary politics by offering Canadians an alternative vehicle for the expression of contemporary opinion. There is nothing to stop the Senate from becoming the type of less-partisan and more publicly-responsive legislative body—an ally of the people, even—that citizens say they want but do not have.

If that is true, then one might argue that out of Dawson (and Ward), a bad tradition emerged! For although these attitudes may be contradictory, and unrealizable, in a single chamber—that is not the case in a bicameral Parliament, and certainly not in the bicameral Parliament envisioned in the Supreme Court's ruling of 2014. The upper chamber has the opportunity to provide a forum to hear the contemporary voice of Canadians. But that will only happen if the crust of partisanship is broken. When that occurs, the crust of public cynicism that is now endemic on the matter of the Senate and its reputation will break as well.

Return to the institutional study of Parliament, but Parliament as a unity, its two chambers linked in reciprocity. This will be difficult for while the old familiar vocabulary will be used, it will be employed to speak a different language. Development will be slow but as studies in path dependency theory have demonstrated, the fact that something happens slowly does not make it unimportant.²⁵ Nor does this change the fact that the Canadian constitutional formula links the public to the executive through Parliament. This is why the House of Commons has indisputable authority to make and unmake governments. One innovates only as a last resort, whether in architecture or constitutional architecture. And no one is proposing to make the Senate a joint confidence chamber. At the same time, it is unreasonable to dismiss Senate activity as a form of trespass or to assume that the upper chamber is

linked to the lower only in some variant of a penitential relationship. There is one Parliament of two chambers, and just as sixty-five years ago Norman Ward wrote an article on “The Formative Years of the House of Commons, 1867-1891,”²⁶ so too will there be need soon for another such exercise in scholarship, this time on the formative years of parliamentary bicameralism.

Endnotes

¹ Michael Bliss, ‘Playing Footsie with the Enemy.’ *National Post*, 4 December 2018, A23.

² Vernon Bogdanor, *The New British Constitution* (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009), 10.

³ R. MacGregor Dawson, *The Principle of Official Independence: with particular reference to the political history of Canada* (London: P.S. King and Son, 1922).

⁴ R. MacGregor Dawson, *Constitutional Issues in Canada, 1900-1931* (London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 1933).

⁵ W.P.M. Kennedy, “Law and Custom in the Canadian Constitution,” in *The Round Table*, December 1929, in *Constitutional Issues in Canada, 1900-1931*, 50-62 at 52.

⁶ Saskatchewan Archives Board, Norman Ward Papers, A526/679, Correspondence 1979-83 (1), Ward to Shirley Spafford, n.d.

⁷ Norman Ward, *The Canadian House of Commons: Representation* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2nd ed., 1963).

⁸ Norman Ward, *The Public Purse: A Study in Canadian Democracy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962).

⁹ Norman Ward, *The Government of Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970).

¹⁰ John C. Courtney, ed., *The Canadian House of Commons: Essays in Honour of Norman Ward* (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1985).

¹¹ J.H. Aitchison, *The Political Process in Canada: Essays in Honour of R. MacGregor Dawson* (University of Toronto Press, 1963).

¹² Norman Ward and David Hoffman, *Bilingualism and Biculturalism in the Canadian House of Commons* (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1970).

¹³ Norman Ward, *A Party Politician: Memoirs of Chubby Power* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1966).

¹⁴ Lewis Namier, *The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George 111* (London: Macmillan, 1929 [1957]).

¹⁵ Barry L. Strayer, *Canada’s Constitutional Revolution* (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 2013), 153.

¹⁶ Alison Loat and Michael MacMillan, *Tragedy in the Commons: Former Members of Parliament Speak Out about Canada’s Failing Democracy* (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2014). For a recent sample of the types of arguments these kinds of issues raise, see Daniel Leblanc, “Liberals Defend Vetting Local Candidates: Amid Accusations of Rigging Races, Party Says It has ‘Sole and Unfettered Discretion’ to Accept or Reject Nomination Bids,” *Globe and Mail*, 7 March 2107, A4.

¹⁷ Memorandum on Representation of the Maritime Provinces. Canadian Sessional Papers, 1914, no.118a, reprinted in *Constitutional Issues in Canada, 1900-1931*, ed. R. MacGregor Dawson (London: Oxford University Press, 1933), 173-75.

¹⁸ *Reference Re Provincial Electoral Boundaries* [1991], 2 S.C.R. 158.

¹⁹ Duff Spafford, “‘Effective Representation’: Reference Re Provincial Electoral Boundaries,” *Saskatchewan Bar Review* 56 (1992), 197-208 at ?.

²⁰ *House of Commons Debates*, 3 April 1868, 455.

²¹ Arthur Sheps. 'The American revolution and the Transformation of English Republicanism,' *Historical Reflections* 2:1 (Summer 1975). 20 [emphasis in original].

²² Alex Marland, *Brand Command: Canadian Politics and Democracy in the Age of Message Control* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016), 46.

²³ *Ibid*, 175.

²⁴ Giuseppe di Lampedusa, *The Leopard* (London: William Collins Sons & Co., 1961), 29.

²⁵ Paul Pierson, *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

²⁶ Norman Ward, "The Formative Years of the House of Commons, 1867-1891," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 18:4 (November 1952), 431-451.